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Introduction 
  
In April of 2016, the biggest data leak in history happened in the form of the publication of 
the Panama Papers, containing compromising information about world leaders. There have  
been previous high-profile data leaks, such as those by the whistleblowing organization 
WikiLeaks, that have exposed morally ambiguous activities by the political elites around the 
world (Evans, 2015). This phenomenon has resulted in a growing narrative about the need for 
more transparency in Western democracies. Due to the scale of the leaks and the nature of the 
information exposed, its relevance to political science cannot be denied. The Panama Papers 
reported on the financial dealings by political leaders, who used their privileged position to 
increase their personal wealth and in doing so, neglected the public interest. This thesis will 
follow the theory by Colin Crouch on post-democracy, which proposes that politics is 
increasingly shaped in private interactions of political and economic elites and citizens have 
become “…manipulated, passive, rare participants” in democracies (2004, p. 21). The 
research question will be: “Can information about the activities of political elites exposed as a 
result of data leaks, challenge the level of control the political elites have over a democratic 
political system?” The main argument is that more transparency as a result of data leaks can 
challenge the high level of control political elites have over the political system in Western 
democracies.   
This research will be a qualitative research focusing on a single case study of Iceland 
with a most likely case design. This means that the contextual conditions for the expected 
relationship between transparency as a result of data leaks and level of control by the political 
elite, are optimal in this case. The analysis will be focus on the political elite in Iceland 
between 2001 and 2016. Firstly, I will present the theoretical framework around the research 
question, followed by the operationalization of the core concepts and methodology for the 
analysis. The second part will consist of the empirical analysis of post-democratic patterns in 
Iceland and the information on activities by the Icelandic political elite, exposed by 
WikiLeaks and in the Panama Papers. Concluding with a critical reflection about the research 
question and the main argument about transparency in a post-democratic society.  
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Theoretical framework  
 
Many scholars have looked at the role of elites in democracies and how they either benefit or 
hinder democratic practice (Bealey, 1996; Engelstad, 2009; Etzioni-Halevy, 1993; Michels, 
1915). Classic elite theorists such as Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto 
have argued that in every societal system, there will be small elites that hold the largest share 
of power. Michels calls this the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (1915). Egalitarian scholar Colin 
Crouch gives a new perspective on the dominant position of ruling elites in modern societies 
in his theory about ‘post-democracy’ The theoretical approach will be central to this thesis. 
Crouch describes a historical timeline of democracy in modern nation-states, in which he 
categorizes a pre-democratic, democratic and post-democratic period. He refers to a post-
democracy as a society which has functioning democratic institutions, yet the control of the 
political system lies with political and economic elites, rather than with the people (Crouch, 
2014). To assess how well a democracy is doing in a society, Crouch measures the scuces of 
democratic practice by comparing it to an ideal of democracy. Besides the occurrence of 
elections, there should be major opportunities for the people in that society to actively 
participate in politics. Citizens are then able to shape the agenda of public life, by actively 
using these opportunities given to them (Crouch, 2004, pp. 2-3). Egalitarian causes such as 
redistribution of wealth and power and restraint of powerful interests is what Crouch finds 
important to strive for, to ensure the wellbeing of citizens (2000, p. 2). Crouch stresses the 
fact that the democratic ideal might not be fully attainable, but he finds that the consideration 
of egalitarian causes can function as markers of ‘health’ of democratic practices in society 
(2004, p. 3).  
Crouch finds empirical evidence pointing towards the growing inequality between the 
powerful elites and the masses. He finds that citizens have become “… manipulated, passive, 
rare participants”  and politics is shaped in private interactions between members of these 
elites (Crouch, 2004, p. 21). His argument is that the current position of the political and 
economic elites has negatively impacted egalitarian causes that serve the public interest 
(Crouch, 2004, p. 10). In order to substantiate his argument, Crouch lists three empirical 
processes that, he claims have led to the concentration of control with political and economic 
elites. The timeline on the societal developments he describes is based around a ‘democratic 
moment’, which he describes as the closest approximation of the ideal for democracy modern 
democracies have experienced  (2000, pp. 2-3). He argues that this moment occurs after a 
great regime change, when the enthusiasm about shaping the political agenda is widespread 
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among members of a society (Crouch, 2004, p. 7). In most Western democracies, this moment 
occurred during the mid-point of the 20
th
 century, following the Second World War (Crouch, 
2004, p. 9). The four main processes used by Crouch to illustrate the shift towards post-
democracy are  
1) economic globalization,  
2) the weakening of political identities based on social class,  
3) the changing relationship between the electorate and party politics and  
4) the commercialization of public services (2004, pp. 31-103).  
The economic globalization and the rise of a transnational capitalism has led to the existence 
of a ‘Global Firm’, according to Crouch (2004, pp. 31-33). This has resulted in interactions 
that are beyond the reach of the nation-state. Corporate interests have penetrated political 
decision-making, which means that the corporate elite can bargain more easily for power and 
influence in political life (Crouch, 2004, p. 52).  
The second process, according to Crouch, is the decrease of social class as a 
significant politicized identity in party politics in Western democracies (2004, pp. 55-57). The 
de-industrialisation of advanced democratic societies has contributed to this process, because 
trade unions have lost importance and specific class interests have become harder to define 
(Crouch, 2004, pp. 53-57). The development of Western states into post-industrial societies 
that are now more focused on the service industry, has resulted in powerful and privileged 
elite, but a general levelling of the socio-economic position of the people in the working and 
middle class (Crouch, 2004, p. 10; Mendieta, 2015, p. 204). Due to these societal changes, the 
political party system has become removed from representing ideological values and class 
interests. This forced political parties to adopt new strategies in order to appeal to their 
electorate (Dommett, 2016, p. 86). Over time, politicians and political parties as organizations 
have taken on more advertisement strategies to sell themselves and their policies as products 
to the masses (Crouch, 2014).  
The third process described by Crouch is the commercialization of citizenship, 
illustrated by the example of the privatization of public services, such as healthcare and 
education (Crouch, 2004, pp. 84-85). As a result, privatized public service providers have 
become an authority outside the political centre and therefore the mechanism of democratic 
control, by citizens, can no longer be applied to these services (Crouch, 2004, pp. 99-103).  
Crouch links these processes to the success of neoliberal ideology in modern societies 
at the beginning of the 21
st
 century (2015, p. 71). Crouch’s argument that we have entered a 
time period where the people in democracies find themselves in a weaker and the political and 
7 
 
economic elites a stronger position to determine the political outcome, is compelling, but has 
also been criticized. The main critique provided by Eduardo Mendieta is that the observed 
processes do not imply the failure of democracy as a system, but rather illustrate the fact that 
there is still the need for democratic societies to further develop (2015, p. 203). Crouch does 
indirectly address this critique by stating that there have been significant trends in modern 
societies that counter the effects of the post-democratic structure, he describes (2014; 2015, p. 
74). An important example of such a trend is the public’s quest for more transparency and 
freedom of information concerning the activities of political and economic elites (Crouch, 
2015, p. 74). 
This thesis is about how more transparency about the activities of the political elites, 
can influence the ability of these elites to control the political system, and thus how more 
transparency can challenge the structure of a post-democratic society.  
Crouch does not operationalize how political and economic elites exercise their 
control over the political system. He describes the relationship between the public and the 
political elites as the paradox of contemporary politics, because both the techniques for 
manipulating the public opinion and the mechanisms for scrutinizing politicians by the public, 
are becoming more sophisticated in modern democracies (Crouch, 2004, p. 21). The core 
assumption of Crouch is that behind the spectacle of electoral politics presented to the public, 
politics is shaped in private interactions between political and business elite (2000, p. 1; 2014) 
The idea of transparency about the actions of the elites as a means to monitor elites, is 
considered by elitist theorists as the power of the public in a democracy (Etzioni-Halevy, 
1993, p. 107). This is supposed to ensure that the existence of powerful ruling elites does not 
undermine the democratic principle of ‘rule by the people’ (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 107). 
The democratic ideal therefore consists of a balance between a relatively autonomous political 
elite and an informed public that can check the behaviour and actions of this elite.  
Crouch finds that, as illustrated by the empirical processes described previously, the 
people in Western democracies have become increasingly apathetic towards politics (2014). 
This means the citizens do not  actively check whether the political elite actually serves the 
public interest (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 104-105). The political elite can be defined as the 
group actually governing or exercising power in a state, and consisting of “ …members of the 
government and of the high administration, military leaders, and in some cases politically 
influential people of the royal family and aristocracy and heads of powerful economic 
enterprises” (Bottomore, 1964, p. 7). Elite theorists argue that in a functioning democracy the 
political elite requires a certain level of autonomy from the public, in order to rule the state 
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effectively (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 109).  However, the precondition for this given 
autonomy, is that the actions of this elite serve the interests of the people they are representing 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 108). To prevent the isolation of the powerful elites from the public 
interest, the public needs to be well informed and able to closely monitor the elite’s actions 
(Barceló, 2016, p. 2; Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 107). When the interaction and circulation 
between members of the public and the political elite is low, the elite can perpetuate their 
power because they do not fear replacement and become more removed from understanding 
the interests of the people  (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 107). This theoretical argument aligns 
with Crouch’s argument that an informed public could make the political elite vulnerable and 
so more inclined to act in the public’s interest in a democracy.  
In the past fifteen years, there have been a number of prominent data leaks containing 
large amounts of information about the political elites’ activities in Western democracies 
(Beyer, The Emergence of a Freedom of Information Movement: Anonymous, WikiLeaks, 
the Pirate Party, and Iceland, 2013, p. 141; Obermayer & Obermaier, The Panama Papers, 
2016, pp. vii-x). The best-known incidences are the data leaks by the whistle-blowing 
organization WikiLeaks, active since 2006,  and  the data exposed in the Panama Papers in 
2016 by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Beyer, 2013, pp. 141-142; 
Obermayer & Obermaier, The Panama Papers, 2016, p. 7). The occurrence of these data leaks 
coincides with the time period Crouch uses in his theory to show the increasingly post-
democratic structure found in Western democracies. Both these data leaks presented the 
public with classified information about the financial dealings and private arrangements made 
by the members of the political elites (Brevini , Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, p. xi; Obermayer & 
Obermaier, The Panama Papers, 2016, p. 10). The information showed members of the 
political elite on occasion acting in self-interest, rather than in the public interest. This has had 
significant implications for the people and organizations mentioned in these data leaks, 
because the information caused public outrage and even led to the resignation of prominent 
figures, such as the prime minister of Iceland (Henley, 2016). This suggests that these 
activities would not have been likely to occur, if the public was informed about it earlier on, 
because it could jeopardize the positions of the members of the political elite.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse whether post-democratic structure and level of 
control of political elites can be challenged when there is more transparency about the 
activities of these elites, as a result of data leaks. If this is the case, this thesis suggests that 
more transparency and freedom of information in Western democracies can justifiably be 
considered a counter-trend to Crouch’s post-democratic processes.  
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Research question, methodology and case selection  
 
The research question of this qualitative research will be as follows: “Can information about 
the activities of political elites exposed as a result of data leaks, challenge the level of control 
the political elites have over a democratic political system?” The thesis will consist of the 
qualitative analysis of the case of Iceland, leading to a critical reflection on the proposition 
that more transparency can be considered a counter-trend to the post-democratic structure 
found in Western democracies. The hypothesis for this thesis is as follows: “Information 
about the activities of political elites exposed in data leaks, can challenge the level of control 
political elites have over the democratic political system.” I will limit myself to analysing the 
political elites in a Western democracy, since Crouch’s theory is based on the political elites 
and democratic institutions in Western societies. The focus of the thesis will be on the level of 
control the political elite has over the political system, through their ability to decide upon the 
allocation of different societal resources. The analysis will leave aside comparing the role of 
other elites, such as media, business and academic elites, because this would not be attainable 
in the time set for this research. Control is conceptualized in this thesis as the elite’s ability to 
decide upon the allocation of four resource types, without outside interference. This 
conceptualization of control by elites follows from elitist theory, in which the capacity to 
control a democratic political system is theoretically linked to the relative autonomy of elites. 
The relative autonomy of the elite is measured in the ability of the elite to control resources 
without interference by other elites and the public (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 98-99).   
The categories of resources are the following: 
Resource type 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 
98-99) 
Relative autonomy  
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 98-
99) 
Empirical indicators  
(Own elaboration) 
Resources for physical 
coercion 
The elite is not subject to 
repression through coercive 
resources of others 
e.g. civil disorder  
Material resources The elite is not dependent on the 
material resources of others 
The elite is in charge of material 
resources, which outsiders 
cannot control 
e.g. control over budgeting 
and spending the financial 
resources of the state 
Administrative/ 
organizational resources 
The elite is not controlled by 
administrative/organization 
resources of others 
e.g. control over a 
bureaucratic apparatus, 
organizations aiding in 
executing policy  
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Table 1. The indicators of relative autonomy for different resource types 
 
The analysis will be of the political elite’s level of control over the empirical indicators that 
are part of table 1, before and after the occurrence of the data leaks. The data leaks used in 
this analysis consist of the information on the Icelandic political elite, leaked by WikiLeaks 
and by an anonymous source, who reached out to the journalists of the Süddeutche Zeitung 
(SZ). This data was later published in the so-called “Panama Papers”. The public has had 
access to this information both via the Internet and via conventional media outlets (i.e. 
newspapers, television and radio) (Beyer, 2013, p. 141; Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, pp. 
257-259). The information consists of evidence about the activities conducted by members of 
the political elite. The members of the political elite in Iceland are the members of the 
government and of the high administration, and politically influential people, such as the 
heads of powerful economic enterprises (Bottomore, 1964, p. 7).  
The analysis will be of a single case with a most likely case design. This means that 
the contextual conditions for the expected relationship between the leaked data about the 
political elite and the level of control of the elite, are optimal in this case. A number of 
scholars have described the strong position of the political elite in Iceland, as well as a shift in 
the political system after 2008 (Grímsson, 1976, pp. 14-25; Magnússon, 2010). Both 
WikiLeaks and the Panama Papers have led to exposure of private financial arrangements of 
Icelandic politicians and political decision-making that was in part responsible for the 
financial crisis of 2008 (Erimtan, 2016, pp. 1-3; Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 
2016, pp. 7-9). Important examples of the impact of the data leaked by WikiLeaks and the 
Panama Papers, were the resignation of the Icelandic Prime Minister in 2016, mass protests in 
the streets of Reykjavik and the new legislature initiatives about freedom of information 
(Beyer, 2013, pp. 147-148).  The time period used in the analysis will be of the past 15 years, 
i.e. between 2001 and 2016, because of the growing relevance of Crouch’s theory and the 
occurrence of data leaks in Western democracies. The indicators for the post-democratic 
structures and level of control of the Icelandic political elite will follow the theoretical work 
of Colin Crouch and of democratic elitist scholars, most notably that of Eva Etzioni-Havely. 
The empirical analysis is based on literature by academic scholars such as Beyer (2013), 
Brevini, Hintz and McCurdy (2013), Kristjánsson (2004) and Mágnusson (2010). The 
Symbolic resources The elite’s activities are not 
dependent on information and 
knowledge constructed or made 
available by others 
e.g. knowledge about 
offshore activities, illegal 
activities, private 
negotiations /arrangements 
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secondary sources consist of relevant documentation about WikiLeaks and the Panama Papers 
by the websites first publishing the respective data, and the coverage by news sites like The 
Guardian, BBC and journalists such as England (2015), Obermayer and Obermaier (2016) 
and Sigurgrimsdottir (2009).  
 
Empirical analysis 
 
Post-democratic patterns in Iceland 
 
To establish whether a post-democratic structure can be found in Iceland, this section will 
contain an analysis of Crouch’s empirical processes applied to society in Iceland, before the 
occurrence of data leaks. This will provide an understanding of the position of the political 
elite with regard to their ability to control societal resources, without outside interference. The 
political elite in Iceland comprises the Icelandic government. The members of parliament and 
the cabinet are made up of 63 people in total. The  president as the head of state, who is 
elected every four years for an unlimited number  of terms, is also part of the government 
(United Nations, 2006, p. 7). Other functions considered to be part of the elite are the heads of 
the prominent banks, the media and agricultural and fishing companies. The reason why they 
are included in Iceland’s political elite is because of the close relationships that exist between  
the politicians and the corporate figures who have historically moved between the high-
ranking positions in both the political and economic sphere (Grímsson, 1976, pp. 11-12; 
Magnússon, 2010, pp. 255-256). This section will start with an historical background of the 
political elite in Iceland, and will result in a conclusion on the level of control of the political 
elite prior to the data leaks by WikiLeaks and in the Panama Papers.  
The time following Iceland’s independence from the Danish Kingdom in June 1944, 
can be described as the ‘democratic moment’ in the history of Iceland. Rapid political 
modernisation and economic development created momentum for structural change in the 
Icelandic political and economic system (Magnússon, 2010, pp. 243-244). However, the 
widespread involvement of the citizens as part of the post-war reconstruction was not as 
strong in Iceland, as Crouch describes it in other Western democracies. The economic 
development was slower in Iceland, because its economy was still heavily reliant on a single 
industry: fishing (Magnússon, 2010, p. 244). Moreover the old elitist structure of the political 
system remained in place in the second half of the 20
th
 century (Magnússon, 2010, p. 244). 
The party system was dominated by a small group of party leaders who, through political and 
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administrative appointments, had a strong hold on the executive and legislative institutions 
(Grímsson, 1976, p. 20). The political interests were also extended into economic and cultural 
institutions, because the leaders of institutions in these spheres of society were appointed by 
the political parties (Grímsson, 1976, pp. 20-21). The coalition system in the Icelandic 
government can be seen as an oligarchic structure, where the voters can only choose from a 
group of already present leaders, all of whom have worked together in the past and are 
required to work together in the future (Grímsson, 1976, pp. 22-24).  
The third quarter of the 20
th
 century is what Crouch pinpoints as the beginning of 
significant economic globalization and the growing influence of mass consumption and mass 
production in Western democracies (2000, p. 13). This manifested itself in Iceland during the 
1980s and 1990s when the status of the traditional industries such as fishing and agriculture 
changed and the jobs in the service industry multiplied (Magnússon, 2010, p. 248). These 
jobs, as well as the technological advancements in all companies, required a higher level of 
skills and education from the labour force (Magnússon, 2010, p. 250). The educational 
revolution in the 1970s  resulted in a better education of the labour force, thereby better 
equipping  the Icelandic society to handle this rapid innovation (Magnússon, 2010, p. 250). 
The macro-economic development in Iceland into the 21
st
 century was staggering. The 
exponentially growing influx of capital during the investment boom of the early 2000s 
resulted in a vast expansion of the banking system in Iceland (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & 
Erlingsdóttir, 2016, pp. 22-23). An important development was the privatization of the banks 
around this time (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, pp. 7-9). Besides the more 
interdependent structure of the global market, the preponderance of the financial sector in 
Iceland was mainly facilitated by its politics (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, 
p. 3). The privatization of the banks was done under conditions favouring the political leaders 
in power at that time.  These privatizations were kept away from regulatory institutions 
overseeing fair trade standards. They were purposefully kept from becoming owned by 
foreign investors or members of the general public (Magnússon, 2010, p. 256).  
The financial crisis in Western democracies in 2008 laid bare the growing influence 
that business interests had gained in politics and policy-making (Crouch, 2015, p. 72). The 
expensive bailouts of the banks by governments, because they were considered ‘too big to 
fail’ emphasized this. The collapse of the banking system Iceland suffered in the financial 
crisis, was the biggest in the world, relative to the size of the country’s economy 
(Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, p. 1). The three main banks, Kaupthing, 
Landsbanki and Glitnir, all failed and a number of their  senior executives were prosecuted 
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and convicted for their role in the high risk financial strategies of the banks (Ingimundarson, 
Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, pp. 21-23). Although the government officials tried to define 
the financial calamity as being a result of the international financial crisis, economic 
researchers argue that it was a clear result of the privatization of the banks, extravagant 
behaviour of Icelandic entrepreneurs and the uncritical support of that behaviour by the 
political parties (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, p. 8).  The financial crisis 
seemingly marked the beginning of a change in Icelandic politics, but Magnússon emphasizes 
that the oligarchic structure present before the crisis, contributed to the extraordinary scale of  
the devastation the  financial crisis in Iceland suffered  in 2008 (2010, pp. 269-270).  
Crouch states the disappearance of social class as a strong politicized identity in 
Western democracies is a relevant process (2004, p. 53). In Iceland, the political party system 
has seen few structural changes up to 2008 (Magnússon, 2010, p. 254). However, the decline 
of the working class did occur in Iceland, a process which Crouch states as part of the de-
politicization of social class in politics (2004, p. 53). The development of new industries and 
the decline of the agricultural and fishing industries in Iceland have contributed to this 
development, as well as the increase of highly educated people, following the educational 
revolution of the 1970s (Magnússon, 2010, pp. 248-256). In Iceland social class was never a 
fundamental principle shaping party politics has never been as it was as in the case of the 
United Kingdom. Therefore, the decline of the working class has not had the same political 
implications as Crouch describes in the UK.  The Icelandic population is small in size, and 
consists of a rather homogenous group of people (Tomasson, 1980, pp. 38-39). This meant 
that the politicization of societal cleavages such as class, religion and ethnicity was not strong 
in Iceland. However, the change on the labour market in Iceland has gone hand in hand with 
the development of more businesses and a growing private sector, lobbying for corporate 
interests in politics. 
The political party system in Iceland has been dominated by a small elite that had a 
very strong influence across all spheres of society, which means that the main societal 
cleavage that has shaped politics in Iceland is between the citizens and the elite itself. The 
political participation and the development of political parties in Iceland has been influenced 
by this cleavage as well. The structure of government allowed the members of political parties 
to form a network, in which they all cooperated with one another in some capacity, either in 
government or in other high-ranking positions (Kristjánsson, 2004, p. 163). This explains this 
patronage-based cooperation found in the ruling elite in Iceland, where mutual benefits and 
favours were exchanged between members of opposing parties (Kristjánsson, 2004, pp. 153-
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154). The capacity of citizens to influence political decision-making in Iceland is difficult 
because of a complex electoral system in which both president and parliament are elected 
(Kristjánsson, 2004, pp. 153-154). The status of “manipulated, passive participant”, Crouch 
uses under the post-democratic model, is certainly applicable to Icelandic citizens. For 
example, as a result of the way in which the financing of political parties is organized. The 
political parties can operate without active partisanship, because they receive a high level of 
public financial support and there are tax deductions for companies giving political 
contributions, without having to disclose this information to the public (Kristjánsson, 2004, p. 
166). The parties are not reliant on financial contributions from citizens via political party 
membership. This is described by Crouch as the increasing influence of lobbying efforts by 
the private businesses to gain political influence (2000, p. 28). The multi-party system in 
Iceland has become a more fragmented and party competition has grown (Kristjánsson, 2004, 
p. 166). The growing importance of drawing in voters from a more volatile electorate has 
meant that the parties had to employ more persuasive techniques in the electoral debate, such 
as more elaborate media campaigns (Crouch, 2004, p. 73; Kristjánsson, 2004, p. 166).  
How about the amount of control of the elite in Iceland? Historically, Iceland has had 
a political elite who firmly dominated the power structure in Iceland, extending into different 
sectors of society (Grímsson, 1976, p. 10). This shows when one compares the position of the 
political elite to the relative autonomy over the allocation of different resource types, as set 
out by Etzioni-Halevy (1993, pp. 98-99). The resource for physical coercion
1
 in Iceland 
consists of the police force, because Iceland does not have a standing army and a very small 
military apparatus (United Nations, 2006, p. 5). The police force and the military people and 
equipment in Iceland fall under the Ministry of the Interior (Icelandic Government, 2016). 
Massive protests or civil disobedience have been rare in Icelandic history (Magnússon, 2010, 
pp. 264-265). This means control over coercive resources before 2008 can be considered 
latent, because the political elite was not forced to provide a visible manifestation of this 
control. The administrative and organizational resources
2
 of the Icelandic political elite are 
also relatively limited, because of the actual size of the government institutions (United 
                                                     
1
 The elite is relative autonomous when it is not subject to repression through coercive 
resources of others, for example indicated by civil disorder (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 98). 
2 The elite is relative autonomous when it is  not dependent on the material resources of others 
The elite is in charge of material resources, which outsiders cannot control, indicated by the  
control over budgeting and spending the financial resources of the state (Etzioni-Halevy, 
1993, pp. 98-99) 
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Nations, 2006, pp. 2-7). The government has control over independent institutions hired to 
perform organizational and administrative tasks. This showed when, during the privatization 
of the banks around 2000, the regulatory institutions such as the Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the Competition and Fair Trade Authority did not get to execute their 
regulatory tasks (Magnússon, 2010, p. 256). This was decided upon by the members of the 
political elite. This illustrates that when organizational and administrative tasks are not 
conducted by members of the political elite, the actual control over the political outcome still 
rests with the political elite.  
The control over material resources
3
 at the disposal of the political elite in Iceland lies 
with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Icelandic Government, 2016). Financial 
affairs of the state, such as the capital controls, fiscal budget, debt management and monetary 
policies are decided by this ministry, be it in cooperation with other institutions as among 
others, the Central Bank of Iceland. Prime Minister Davíð Oddsson and the high-ranking 
personnel in economic enterprises shaped the economic development between 1991 and 2004 
with neo-liberal policies (Boyes, 2009, pp. 6-7). This led to the privatization of companies 
and of the banks, which was implemented under favourable terms for the political parties in 
power at the time (Magnússon, 2010, p. 256). The enormous economic growth and the 
potential for personal wealth for the people in power, determined the direction of policy on 
the state finances (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, pp. 26-29). The close 
relationship between the economic and political elite bolstered their ability to control the 
material resources of the state in the first eight years of the 21
th
 century.  
The symbolic resources
4
 of the elite are defined by the extent to which knowledge 
about the activities by the political elite can limit the elite (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 98-99). 
The transparency about the activities of the political elite was very minimal (England, 2015). 
In a democracy, the media informs the public about things that may concern them and could 
potentially influence the citizens’ voting behaviour (Bealey, 1996, p. 326).  In Iceland, media 
companies are partly owned by people that were either part of the political elite or closely 
connected to members of the elite  The media were not considered to fulfil their task as 
                                                     
3
 The elite is considered relatively autonomous when it is not controlled by 
administrative/organization resources of others, indicated by the control over a bureaucratic 
apparatus, organizations aiding in executing policy (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 98-99) 
4
 The elite is considered relatively autonomous when it’s activities are not dependent on 
information and knowledge constructed or made available by others, indicated by the public’s 
knowledge about offshore activities, illegal activities, private negotiations /arrangements 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, pp. 98-99) 
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watchdog, because of this conflict of interest for the owners of national media outlets 
(Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 256). Therefore, Iceland’s political elite had the ability to 
monitor what the public knew about the activities of the elite before 2008. This meant that 
they were relatively autonomous from others exposing sensitive information, that could 
jeopardize the position of members of the elite. This lack of transparency meant the elite was 
less vulnerable to public scrutiny and the people in power were less likely to be held 
accountable for behaviour that did not serve the public interest. The presence of similar 
processes as those outlined by Crouch, as well as the level of control of Iceland’s political 
elite had with regard to the different resource types concludes that the elite was able to control 
the political system without much interference, before the occurrence of data leaks. 
 
The data leaks 
 
Iceland has experienced two incidences of leaked information regarding the activities by 
members of the political elite after 2008 (Beyer, 2013, p. 141; Obermayer & Obermaier, 
2016, pp. 255-264). This section of the analysis will provide background information about 
the nature of the information that was leaked, and the events that transpired as a result of the 
leaks.  
The information was published by WikiLeaks over the course of 2009 and in the 
Panama Papers in April 2016 (Beyer, 2013, pp. 143-144; Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer, & 
Jaschensky, 2016). The data leaked consisted of millions of documents and e-mails stolen 
from different institutions, such as government agencies and the law-firm Mossack Fonseca 
(Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer, & Jaschensky, 2016). The leaks made the headlines all 
over the world. This analysis does not cover all the information these leaks brought to light, 
but will be focussing on the information that particularly concerned the Icelandic public.  
WikiLeaks is an active non-profit, whistle-blower organization, which publishes data 
provided by anonymous sources on their website (Beyer, 2013, p. 143). The first encounter of 
people in Iceland  had with WikiLeaks was at an event of the Icelandic Digital Freedom 
Society (Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, p. xi). The information published that had a direct 
connection to the activities of the political elite in Iceland, consisted of a loan book of 
Kaupthing Bank (Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, p. xi). Shortly after the devastating 
financial crisis hit the Icelandic economy, the loan book provided insight into the high-risk 
strategies used by one of the three largest banks (Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, pp. xi-xii; 
WikiLeaks, 2016). The loan book showed the bank issuing huge loans to a number of 
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companies, that made the bank vulnerable to the kind of financial collapse that actually 
occurred shortly afterwards (Sigurgrimsdottir, 2009). Moreover, in an attempt to keep the 
information away from the public, a temporary injunction was secured by Kaupthing Bank, 
against the coverage of this loan book by the state broadcaster Ríkisútvarpið (RUV), several 
minutes before the broadcast was going live (Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, p. 150).  This 
emphasized how highly sensitive the matter was. In response, RUV referred their viewers 
directly to the WikiLeaks website. The injunction was subsequently lifted because of public 
outrage (Sigurgrimsdottir, 2009).  
From 2006 onwards, the call for revision of the current intellectual property regimes 
took shape in an international network of “pirate parties” (Beyer, 2013, p. 144). The data 
exposed by WikiLeaks made this international network grow and increase their political 
traction in different states (Beyer, 2013, p. 144).  Birgitta Jónsdóttir, a former member of 
WikiLeaks and an Icelandic activist, has led the freedom-of-information movement in 
Iceland, aimed at making Iceland a safe space for the whistleblowers and publishers who were 
responsible for providing this information to the public (Brevini, Hintz, & McCurdy, 2013, p. 
xii). WikiLeaks set in motion the legislative reform around freedom of information in Iceland 
(Beyer, 2013, pp. 147-148). The Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI) was the new 
legislative regime proposed to the government by Jónsdottir and her supporters, which 
consisted of a compilation of international examples of legal protections for whistle-blowers, 
journalists and publishers with regard to freedom of speech (Beyer, 2013, p. 147). The 
resolution made in this initiative was adopted by the Icelandic parliament in 2010, and is still 
gradually being implemented into Icelandic law (International Modern Media Institute, 2016). 
An example of this new legislation can be found in the Information Act, adopted in 2013, 
which has as its main objective “[…] to guarantee transparency in government administration 
and the handling of public interests…”.5 In order to channel the support of the public for more 
transparency and to push the proposed reform that would ensure more transparency, the 
Icelandic Pirate Party was founded in 2012. Jónsdottir was one of the founders of the Pirate 
Party, that was set up aiming for more transparency about the government and their policies.
6
 
                                                     
5
 The Information Act No 140/2012 was adopted into Icelandic law in 2013.  
6
 The Icelandic Pirate Party states the following on transparency in their core policy (2016): 
Transparency gives the powerless the power to monitor the powerful. Pirates believe that 
transparency is an important part of making the public informed and thereby capable of 
making democratic decisions. Information should be accessible to the public. Information 
should be accessible in open data formats, in a form that is most convenient for the usability 
of the information. Pirates believe that everyone has an unlimited right to be involved in 
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The party participated for the first time in the 2013 parliamentary elections and gained 5% of 
the popular vote, which ensured the party three seats in parliament (BBC, 2013). 
The quest for more transparency coincided with a historically low level of trust in 
politicians in Iceland, following the financial crisis in 2008 (Helgadóttir, 2011, p. 2).The 
discussion about the need for constitutional reform was reopened by a grassroots movement 
led by citizens, after the people took to the streets in protest to the decisions made by the 
political elite that led to the crisis (Landemore, 2015, pp. 168-169). The Icelandic 
constitution, drafted after the independence from Denmark in 1944, was considered out-dated 
and had allowed the political elite to manoeuvre the country into the devastating financial 
crisis of 2008 (Landemore, 2015, p. 169). The reform was aimed to increase the democratic 
involvement of the citizens and enhance their capacity to control the government’s decision-
making, for example, by increasing legislative control, parliamentary control of the executive 
and the possibility for citizens to call for a referendum, and to block legislation or to table 
bills (England, 2015; Helgadóttir, 2011, pp. 6-8). The Pirate Party set the adoption of a new 
constitution as one of the most important goals in their 2016 election (Icelandic Pirate Party 
(II), 2016).
7
  
The second notable data leak was published in April 2016 in the Panama Papers. This 
data leak consisted of approximately 11,5 million documents leaked from the law firm 
Mossack Fonseca, based in Panama (Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer, & Jaschensky, 2016) 
An unknown source started sending the documents to two journalists, Bastian Obermayer and 
Frederik Obermaier, at the German newspaper the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) in 2015.The 
documents were all internal documents, correspondence and databases from Mossack 
Fonseca, exposing attorney-client relations about more than 214,000 offshore entities 
(Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer, & Jaschensky, 2016). The clients of this law firm ranged 
from political leaders, celebrities, fraudsters, criminals and powerful businessmen and 
exposed their hidden financial dealings (Obermayer, Obermaier, Wormer, & Jaschensky, 
2016). The extensive amount of data forced the journalists at the Süddeutche Zeitung to call 
in the help of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) (Obermayer & 
                                                                                                                                                                     
decisions that relate to their own affairs, and a right to knowledge about how such decisions 
are made. 
7
 The Pirate Party states in the 2016 Elections Manifesto from October (2016): “Icelandic 
Pirates believe that adopting the Constitutional Council’s new constitution is a basic 
precondition for improving Icelandic society.” 
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Obermaier, 2016, pp. 47-49). The leaked documents and e-mails were not published directly 
to the public by the ICIJ, but reported on by the journalists for different media outlets. The 
Icelandic journalist Johannes Kr. Kristjansson was the investigative reporter from the ICIJ 
who reported on the Panama Papers in Iceland (Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 256).  
The data from Mossack Fonseca contained information about an offshore company the 
Icelandic Prime Minister, Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, had previously owned. 
Gunnlaugsson and his wife, Anna Sigurlaug Pálsdóttir, owned a shell company8 in the British 
Virgin Islands, called Wintris Incorporated (Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, pp. 257-263). 
The data showed that at the time Mr. Gunnlaugsson came into office, he was no longer the 
official owner of Wintris Inc., because he had sold 50% of his shares for a symbolic 1$  to his 
wife in 2009 (Henley, 2016). This company held nearly 4 million dollars’ worth of bonds in 
the three Icelandic banks that went bankrupt in the 2008 financial crisis; Glitnir, Landsbanki 
and Kaupthing (Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, pp. 258-261). Gunnlaugsson was also the 
chairman of the Progressive Party, and a spokesperson for the civil society group InDefence 
(Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 261). This group had as its objective to represent the 
citizens of Iceland in the political clash on the Landsbanki’s subsidiary Icesave credit default 
(Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 260). Unknown to the public, Wintris Inc. was one of the 
creditors trying to get money back from Icesave (Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 261). 
Therefore, Gunnlaugsson represented both sides in the negotiations being both a former 
creditor, married to a current creditor as well as representing the taxpaying citizens of Iceland.  
In April 2016 Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson was confronted with the information in an 
interview by Jóhannes Kr. Kristjansson, for his independent news platform Reykjavik Media 
(Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016, p. 263). Kristjansson confronted the Prime Minister with the 
information from the leak on Gunnlaugsson’s involvement with Wintris Inc., which prompted 
the Prime Minister to walk out of the interview (Henley, 2016). The video resulted in public 
outrage, which led to 10,000 to 20,000 people demonstrating and calling for the resignation of 
the government (Henley, 2016).  The Prime Minister tried to avoid having to resign, by trying 
to convince the public that he always served the public interest (Henley, 2016).  He asked the 
President to dissolve the parliament and write out new elections, but the President Grímsson 
refused to do this (Henley, 2016). The Prime Minister was consequently forced to resign, but 
his government stayed on. Gunnlaugsson’s successor, Gudni Johansson, did manage to hold 
                                                     
8
 The definition of a shell company as given by Obermayer et al.  (2016, pp350):  a company 
that has no employees at its official registered office – which is normally at the address of the 
registered agent – but only a letterbox.   
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parliamentary elections six months before the scheduled date, on the 29
th
 of October 2016 
(The Guardian, 2016). In the run up to this election, the Pirate Party  led  the polls, because 
they had gained momentum after the Panama Papers (Leruth, 2016). They received 14,5% of 
the popular vote and became the third largest party represented in parliament, with ten seats in 
the parliament (Positive News, 2013). Gunnlaugsson’s party, the Progressive Party, lost 
eleven seats compared to the previous parliamentary elections in 2013 (Leruth, 2016).  
 
Increased transparency  
 
Looking again at the research question: “Can information about the activities of political 
elites exposed in data leaks, challenge the level of control the political elites have over a 
democratic political system?”., I contend that the analysis of Iceland indeed suggests that that 
the data leaks have led to several societal developments challenging the level of control of the 
political elite in the political system. The financial crisis of 2008 sparked large-scale protests 
in Iceland (England, 2015). The protests were attributed to the fact that people were angry 
about the decisions made and the information withheld from the them in the wake of this 
crisis, that affected them severely (Ingimundarson, Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, pp. 21-
233)The historical dominance of the political elite the Icelandic society has provided the 
institutional build-up to the financial collapse and the subsequent response by the public 
(Magnússon, 2010, p. 256). The financial crisis brought to light the damage the political elite 
had done with their, high-risk economic strategies and policies that benefited the private 
interests of politicians and wealthy business leaders (i.e. themselves), rather than the citizens. 
WikiLeaks became the platform to provide the people with hard evidence about these 
activities of the powerful elite. The revelations about Kaupthing bank by WikiLeaks 
substantiated the feeling of distrust towards the political elite. Iceland is one of the few 
nations that has seen sentencing of people in the banking sector, who were held accountable 
for their bad judgement resulting in the severity of the financial collapse (Ingimundarson, 
Urfalino, & Erlingsdóttir, 2016, p. 24).  
 The growing demand for more transparency, starting internationally around 2006, has 
been operationalized very clearly by activists such as Brigitta Jónsdottir. The legislative 
reform in the shape of the Iceland Modern Media Initiative, grass-root organized 
constitutional reform and the political ambitions of the Pirate Party, all show concrete efforts 
for embedding more institutional mechanisms that guarantee more transparency. The 
occurrence of mass protests illustrates severe civil unrest, meaning civil order was being 
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interfered with by the public. These protests were a rare occurrence in Iceland, but there have 
been a number of these protests from 2008 onwards (Magnússon, 2010, p. 256). Also after the 
Panama Papers, the public took to the streets to demand the resignation of their government. 
The data leak incited the demonstrations, aimed at coercing the political elite to resign. This 
effectively diminishes the relative autonomy of the elite with regard to resources of physical 
coercion. The demand for a new constitution to reestablish a more direct control by the public 
over policy making, also challenges relative autonomy of the political elite over 
organizational and material resources. The proposed mechanisms of increasing the public 
control, such as the ability for citizens to table a bill and call a referendum, would make it 
more difficult for the political elite to control the policy on state finances and to avoid control 
by regulatory institutions. This is because there would be more options available to the public, 
to alter the decisions made by the political elite. This means that the political elite are more 
dependent on the citizens’ approval, and thus more likely to pursue the public interest rather 
than private interests in policy. However, the constitutional reform bill has been shelved by 
the parliament, after the Supreme Court annulled the assembly of 25 elected delegates in 2011 
(Landemore, 2015, pp. 169-170). This raises the question, whether the Icelandic political elite 
are reluctant to give up the relative autonomy they still possess. The information exposed in 
the data leaks have contributed to more intensified efforts to realize the constitutional reform 
(Positive News, 2013). But it cannot be stated that the leaks have exclusively caused this. The 
drive for constitutional reform could also have been the direct result of the exposure of the 
destructive financial policies leading to the financial crisis, without this information being 
leaked to the public.  
 However, the data leaks have illustrated how the political elite’s activities can be 
influenced by information made available by actors outside the elite. The information in the 
loan book of one of the three defaulted banks would not have been published if the political 
elite would have been able to control the release of that information, because it implicated the 
political elite as negligent in their task to keep the country’s economy prosperous. In the case 
of the Panama Papers the data pointed directly to the Prime Minister’s involvement in 
financial dealings, which he chose not to disclose to the public (Obermayer & Obermaier, 
2016, p. 257). This shows that members of the political elite are more vulnerable, because the 
exposure of information can lead to the public demanding their resignation. The growing 
support for the Pirate Party, who rallied behind legislative reform that would enable more 
transparency, has led to more votes and therefore has resulted in different people filling seats 
in parliament. The relative autonomy over symbolic resources, such as the knowledge people 
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outside the political elite have about the elite’s activities, is challenged when individuals are 
taking it upon themselves to expose classified information to the public. This might not be 
legal, but it makes the political elite less capable to control what the people know about them 
and it can even jeopardize their own position as member of the political elite. Therefore, the 
increased transparency through the data leaked by WikiLeaks and in the Panama Papers, 
challenged the level of control the political elite had over the political system in Iceland.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The political system in Iceland has been ruled by a political elite that had a lot of freedom to 
control the societal resources, without outside interference. This elite was historically small 
and close-knit, which enabled it to keep high-ranking positions in all sectors of society. 
During the largest part of the twentieth century, politics was mostly shaped in private 
interactions, away from the public. Thus, my contention is that the empirical processes, 
Crouch uses in his theoretical model, are indeed found in the recent history of Iceland. 
However, the financial crisis of 2008 marked the dawn of a new era in Icelandic politics. The 
financial collapse presented the public with knowledge of the high risk strategies employed 
by their political elite, which woke the citizens up to the fact that their political elite was not 
serving their interests. The data leaks added fuel to fire and gave the public undeniable 
evidence of this fact, which led to a stronger mobilization in the form of a quest for 
constitutional and legislative reform, and the electoral shift to a new political party. The 
Panama Papers has as a direct consequence the resignation of the Prime Minister, one of the 
highest ranking officials in the political elite, because of his offshore financial dealings 
coming to light. This has shown what powerful impact these kind of information leaks can 
have on a , political elite that considered itself in control.  
The manipulated, passive role of citizens in a democratic society is what Crouch 
describes as a symptom of post-democracy. The events that have transpired after the data 
leaks show a more active public that has rallied to enforce changes in their political system. 
The request for more direct ways to influence policy-making has followed from a grassroots 
civil society movement that formulated a new constitution. As said before, although these 
developments cannot in the context of this research exclusively be ascribed to the occurrence 
of the data leaks, the sudden transparency around the political elite has facilitated the 
formulation of what the public desires to change about the political system. It even resulted in 
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the implementation of institutional mechanisms, such as new legislature, to see this change 
through. This means that citizens are as a result more actively involved in shaping the 
political agenda for public life, which is what Crouch finds, is the desirable dynamic between 
the public and a government in a democracy. The excessive control the political elite has in a 
political system is then challenged by the increased transparency about the activities of the 
elite.  This means that this increased transparency could be considered a counter-trend to the 
post-democratic structure found in Iceland. 
The generalization of the findings of the Icelandic case study to other Western 
democracies, has to be qualified. Firstly, the size of the population of Iceland is significantly 
smaller than most Western democracies (i.e. approximately 300,000 people). This analysis 
does not take into account how the size of the population and consequently the size of the 
political elite, can influence the relative autonomy of the political elite in a country. Secondly, 
the financial crisis was, specifically in the case of Iceland, a very important factor in 
aggravating the public, before the leaked information was brought to light. The devastating 
economic collapse of 2008 had already mobilized the Icelandic citizens. The information 
exposed in the data leaks fuelled the already existing discontent of the citizens further, which 
might have led to a similar mobilization to without the data leaks. Other Western democracies 
have experienced a similar financial crisis around 2008. However, it would require more 
research to establish whether the level of control of their economic and political elites has 
been challenged as a result of the data leaks by WikiLeaks and the Panama Papers. This 
analysis does not allow for a generalization of this conclusion to apply to other Western 
democracies, because it does not account for the possibility of intervening factors that need to 
be measured in order to conclusively find a causal relationship between data leaks and the 
level of control political elites have in a democratic political system.  
Having said that, it does seem to invite a revisiting of Crouch’s theory on post-
democracy, as he holds a very negative outlook on the prospects of democracy as a viable 
system for Western states. His scenario of a post-democracy suggests that the democratic 
institutions we currently have in our society are not worth having anymore if they do not 
operate in accordance with the theoretical ideal set out by him and other scholars. But, as 
Crouch mentions himself, Western democracies have never met the standards of this ideal and 
are unlikely to ever do so. The fact that there has been a notable response to the excessive 
control by the political elite over the political system in Iceland probably means that the 
passiveness of the public, he describes, should be understood as a dormant discontent that 
needs a sudden exposure of relevant information, to mobilize it into action. Data leaks can 
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then be seen as catalysts, facilitating this much needed ‘shock to the system’. This would 
mean that democratic systems may have the potential to be more resilient and that the public 
can wake up to reassert itself, thus avoiding the rather gloomy prospect of Crouch’s post-
democracy.           
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